At the meeting of the UN Security Council on July 4th, US Ambassador to the UN
Nikki Haley called upon the UNSC to condemn North Korea’s ICBM test and impose
further sanctions. Russia and China made it very clear that they do not view
the situation as terribly urgent, with the Russian ambassador questioning
whether the missile should even be considered an ICBM. Ambassador Haley was
visibly agitated in her response, saying “If you are happy with North Korea’s
actions, veto it (the resolution). If you want to be a friend to North Korea,
veto it.”
In 2016, China and Russia allowed the adoption of UNSC
resolutions 2321 and 2270,
which expanded sanctions on North Korea, but despite their cooperation on sanctions thus far, both countries’ statements at the July 4th meeting
included mention of an alternative plan which they referred to as “dual
suspension and parallel progress.” They called on the DPRK to suspend nuclear
and missile tests and called on the
US and South Korea to halt joint military exercises, with both sides thus
making concessions in order to lay the ground for negotiations. For a while
now, Chinese and Russian diplomats have (rightly) been pointing out that the US and North
Korea have set mutually incompatible preconditions for negotiation: the US
demands that the DPRK give up its nuclear weapons before talks can proceed,
while the DPRK has written its status as a nuclear power into its constitution
and demands that the US enter bilateral talks with no preconditions.
Would China and Russia veto the upcoming resolution, and
maybe even propose an alternative resolution condemning the provocative actions
on both sides? Given their votes last year, that would surprise me. But given
their chaffering about whether or not this was really an ICBM, and their
mention of the alternative “dual suspension” plan, I wouldn’t be terribly
surprised if they abstained. Nor would I be surprised if they voted to adopt,
but then quietly continued to violate whatever new sanctions were adopted.
President Xi offered his view on the matter a couple days later at the G20, saying, in essence:
China supports peace and stability, China supports the existing sanctions (no
word on new sanctions), China favors dialog and negotiation, and Seoul should
address “China’s legitimate concern” (translation: China will not lift a finger
until the US removes THAAD from South Korea).
Remember this tweet?
I consider it quite questionable whether China ever tried. Many observers took heart when China announced in February that they would be reducing coal imports from North Korea, in keeping with Resolution 2321, but there are reasons to think that this had to do with China’s domestic market. Regardless of coal, trade in other goods has continued apace. As Trump noted in a more recent tweet:
Oh well! Had to give it a try! China-NK trade increased 37.4% in Q1 2017, according to China’s official data. That probably does not reflect the full extent of their bilateral trade, as there is considerable black market cross-border trade. And whether or not China has cut coal imports because of Resolution 2321, China has continued importing various minerals from North Korea in violation of Resolutions 2321 and 2270.
So why is China so wishy-washy when it comes to North Korea?
There is reason to expect that China might be willing to cut
North Korea loose. Neither the leaders nor the people of China have much
respect for Kim Jong Un. He is widely mocked on Chinese social media, where netizens have nicknamed him “Fatty Kim the third”. The last
couple years have also seen China issuing harsher rebukes to North Korea via
its state media, and in May, North Korean media directly criticized China for the first
time, stating: “The DPRK will never beg for the maintenance of friendship with China, risking
its nuclear program which is as precious as its own life, no matter how valuable
the friendship is.” Also, a somewhat under-reported angle of Kim executing his
uncle Jang Song-thaek was that Jang was one of North Korea’s leading advocates
for closer ties to China and Chinese-style economic reforms. In short, the
relationship is at an all-time low.
China’s relationship with the US may seem quite sunny by
comparison. Sure, we have our differences, but whether you label us “strategic
rivals” or “frenemies”, it’s hard to deny that China gets a lot out of its
relationship with the US, with a trade relationship worth $648.2 billion in 2016 and 300,000 Chinese students in the US. But when it comes to national security, no matter how deep our economic and cultural
ties, the Communist Party of China still regards the US as its greatest threat,
far more dangerous than North Korea.
The DPRK is an official ally of China, with the Sino-North
Korea Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty of 1961 still in effect. The
longstanding view in China is that China and North Korea have a
relationship “forged in blood” in the Korean War. As Mao used to say, China and
North Korea “are like lips and teeth.” On a more analytical level, the Chinese military
regards North Korea as a buffer against the United States. That is, a buffer
against the 28,500 US troops stationed in South Korea. If the North Korean
state collapsed, China would face a flood refugees, the possible proliferation
of nuclear materials into China by the hands of non-state actors, and a united,
democratic, capitalist Republic of Korea which might allow US troops to be
stationed on its northern border, across the Yalu River from China.
This view of the DPRK as a security asset to China is not unchallenged in Chinese academia
and think tank-dom, where a number of prominent scholars have criticized China’s
North Korea policy (and yes, scholars are allowed to criticize state policies
in China—scholars who are Party members doing research at Party think tanks publishing in Party journals and Party newspapers).
Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia[1]
have argued that the Chinese state is essentially deluded about North
Korea. According to them, the Party believes that North Korea, as a socialist
state, automatically shares China’s values and therefore is deserving of China’s
loyalty. But actually, North Korea is more akin to a militaristic hereditary
monarchy, and therefore not ideologically compatible with China. Furthermore,
with his erratic and insulting behavior, Kim Jong Un does massive damage to
China’s international image. Shen and Yafeng therefore advocate that China should
cut off all economic support for North Korea and cooperate with the US in
denuclearization. Shi Yinhong[2]
has made similar arguments, saying that China cannot simultaneously support the
DPRK, uphold stability on the Korean Peninsula, and push denuclearization. His view is that China
should use its economic power to punish North Korea for its arrogant attitude toward China.
For now, however, the traditionalist line holds. However
much China's leaders are willing to trade with America, send their children to American universities, and buy American real estate, they still don’t trust
America when it comes to China’s national security. And why should they? As
they see it, America is the only reason they are unable to reunite their
country by taking back Taiwan, America backs a newly militaristic Japan which
means China ill, America further tries to undermine China’s territorial
integrity in the South China Sea, America creates chaos in China’s backyard
(see: Afghanistan), America harbors dissidents who would like to topple the
Chinese state, America supports “color revolutions” to topple authoritarian
governments around the world, and America has military bases in various
countries around China’s perimeter. Furthermore, the official line in China is
still that America started the Korean War (or as it is known in China, the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid North Korea). In
short, the Party believes that America and its puppets have long pursued a
conspiracy to hold China down and overthrow the Chinese state if possible. And
are they wrong?
What about America’s endgame on the Korean Peninsula? Would
America really be satisfied simply to get rid of North Korea’s nuclear
capabilities? Once we had the DPRK in that position, wouldn’t regime change be
next on the list? Or suppose the North Korean state collapsed. When exactly would
America withdraw those 28,500 troops? Wouldn’t we want to keep them there, to support
South Korea in securing their new borders, reconstruction, whatever?
Instead of complaining about China’s lack of cooperation,
perhaps Washington should ask itself: why should China care? How does China
stand to gain from cooperating with us? Is a defanged DPRK really in China’s
best interest? Have we demonstrated how that may be so? What have we done to
reassure China that we respect its national security interests? I believe that
a denuclearized North Korea would be in China’s best interest as well as America's. As Zhu Feng and
Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga have pointed out, the security risks which the DPRK
presents to China include: “unintended war, endangers Chinese citizens [via
radiation], refugee issues, crime, nuclear blackmail, illicit nuclear
proliferation, […] ballistic missile defense, regional nuclear proliferation,
regional arms race, damaged credibility, legitimizes US ‘rebalancing.’”[3]
That is a not inconsiderable list. And now North Korea has taken to openly criticizing China. So one
has to wonder: how is it that America’s government continues to do such a bad
job of convincing China that we are trustworthy—or at least worthy of cooperation?
