Why China Won't Help with North Korea

At the meeting of the UN Security Council on July 4th, US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley called upon the UNSC to condemn North Korea’s ICBM test and impose further sanctions. Russia and China made it very clear that they do not view the situation as terribly urgent, with the Russian ambassador questioning whether the missile should even be considered an ICBM. Ambassador Haley was visibly agitated in her response, saying “If you are happy with North Korea’s actions, veto it (the resolution). If you want to be a friend to North Korea, veto it.”

In 2016, China and Russia allowed the adoption of UNSC resolutions 2321 and 2270, which expanded sanctions on North Korea, but despite their cooperation on sanctions thus far, both countries’ statements at the July 4th meeting included mention of an alternative plan which they referred to as “dual suspension and parallel progress.” They called on the DPRK to suspend nuclear and missile tests and called on the US and South Korea to halt joint military exercises, with both sides thus making concessions in order to lay the ground for negotiations. For a while now, Chinese and Russian diplomats have (rightly) been pointing out that the US and North Korea have set mutually incompatible preconditions for negotiation: the US demands that the DPRK give up its nuclear weapons before talks can proceed, while the DPRK has written its status as a nuclear power into its constitution and demands that the US enter bilateral talks with no preconditions. 

Would China and Russia veto the upcoming resolution, and maybe even propose an alternative resolution condemning the provocative actions on both sides? Given their votes last year, that would surprise me. But given their chaffering about whether or not this was really an ICBM, and their mention of the alternative “dual suspension” plan, I wouldn’t be terribly surprised if they abstained. Nor would I be surprised if they voted to adopt, but then quietly continued to violate whatever new sanctions were adopted.

President Xi offered his view on the matter a couple days later at the G20, saying, in essence: China supports peace and stability, China supports the existing sanctions (no word on new sanctions), China favors dialog and negotiation, and Seoul should address “China’s legitimate concern” (translation: China will not lift a finger until the US removes THAAD from South Korea).

Remember this tweet?

I consider it quite questionable whether China ever tried. Many observers took heart when China announced in February that they would be reducing coal imports from North Korea, in keeping with Resolution 2321, but there are reasons to think that this had to do with China’s domestic market. Regardless of coal, trade in other goods has continued apace. As Trump noted in a more recent tweet:

Oh well! Had to give it a try! China-NK trade increased 37.4% in Q1 2017, according to China’s official data. That probably does not reflect the full extent of their bilateral trade, as there is considerable black market cross-border trade. And whether or not China has cut coal imports because of Resolution 2321, China has continued importing various minerals from North Korea in violation of Resolutions 2321 and 2270.

So why is China so wishy-washy when it comes to North Korea?

There is reason to expect that China might be willing to cut North Korea loose. Neither the leaders nor the people of China have much respect for Kim Jong Un. He is widely mocked on Chinese social media, where netizens have nicknamed him “Fatty Kim the third”. The last couple years have also seen China issuing harsher rebukes to North Korea via its state media, and in May, North Korean media directly criticized China for the first time, stating: “The DPRK will never beg for the maintenance of friendship with China, risking its nuclear program which is as precious as its own life, no matter how valuable the friendship is.” Also, a somewhat under-reported angle of Kim executing his uncle Jang Song-thaek was that Jang was one of North Korea’s leading advocates for closer ties to China and Chinese-style economic reforms. In short, the relationship is at an all-time low.

China’s relationship with the US may seem quite sunny by comparison. Sure, we have our differences, but whether you label us “strategic rivals” or “frenemies”, it’s hard to deny that China gets a lot out of its relationship with the US, with a trade relationship worth $648.2 billion in 2016 and 300,000 Chinese students in the US. But when it comes to national security, no matter how deep our economic and cultural ties, the Communist Party of China still regards the US as its greatest threat, far more dangerous than North Korea.

The DPRK is an official ally of China, with the Sino-North Korea Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty of 1961 still in effect. The longstanding view in China is that China and North Korea have a relationship “forged in blood” in the Korean War. As Mao used to say, China and North Korea “are like lips and teeth.” On a more analytical level, the Chinese military regards North Korea as a buffer against the United States. That is, a buffer against the 28,500 US troops stationed in South Korea. If the North Korean state collapsed, China would face a flood refugees, the possible proliferation of nuclear materials into China by the hands of non-state actors, and a united, democratic, capitalist Republic of Korea which might allow US troops to be stationed on its northern border, across the Yalu River from China.

This view of the DPRK as a security asset to China is not unchallenged in Chinese academia and think tank-dom, where a number of prominent scholars have criticized China’s North Korea policy (and yes, scholars are allowed to criticize state policies in China—scholars who are Party members doing research at Party think tanks publishing in Party journals and Party newspapers). Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia[1] have argued that the Chinese state is essentially deluded about North Korea. According to them, the Party believes that North Korea, as a socialist state, automatically shares China’s values and therefore is deserving of China’s loyalty. But actually, North Korea is more akin to a militaristic hereditary monarchy, and therefore not ideologically compatible with China. Furthermore, with his erratic and insulting behavior, Kim Jong Un does massive damage to China’s international image. Shen and Yafeng therefore advocate that China should cut off all economic support for North Korea and cooperate with the US in denuclearization. Shi Yinhong[2] has made similar arguments, saying that China cannot simultaneously support the DPRK, uphold stability on the Korean Peninsula, and push denuclearization. His view is that China should use its economic power to punish North Korea for its arrogant attitude toward China.

For now, however, the traditionalist line holds. However much China's leaders are willing to trade with America, send their children to American universities, and buy American real estate, they still don’t trust America when it comes to China’s national security. And why should they? As they see it, America is the only reason they are unable to reunite their country by taking back Taiwan, America backs a newly militaristic Japan which means China ill, America further tries to undermine China’s territorial integrity in the South China Sea, America creates chaos in China’s backyard (see: Afghanistan), America harbors dissidents who would like to topple the Chinese state, America supports “color revolutions” to topple authoritarian governments around the world, and America has military bases in various countries around China’s perimeter. Furthermore, the official line in China is still that America started the Korean War (or as it is known in China, the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid North Korea). In short, the Party believes that America and its puppets have long pursued a conspiracy to hold China down and overthrow the Chinese state if possible. And are they wrong?

What about America’s endgame on the Korean Peninsula? Would America really be satisfied simply to get rid of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities? Once we had the DPRK in that position, wouldn’t regime change be next on the list? Or suppose the North Korean state collapsed. When exactly would America withdraw those 28,500 troops? Wouldn’t we want to keep them there, to support South Korea in securing their new borders, reconstruction, whatever?

Instead of complaining about China’s lack of cooperation, perhaps Washington should ask itself: why should China care? How does China stand to gain from cooperating with us? Is a defanged DPRK really in China’s best interest? Have we demonstrated how that may be so? What have we done to reassure China that we respect its national security interests? I believe that a denuclearized North Korea would be in China’s best interest as well as America's. As Zhu Feng and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga have pointed out, the security risks which the DPRK presents to China include: “unintended war, endangers Chinese citizens [via radiation], refugee issues, crime, nuclear blackmail, illicit nuclear proliferation, […] ballistic missile defense, regional nuclear proliferation, regional arms race, damaged credibility, legitimizes US ‘rebalancing.’”[3] That is a not inconsiderable list. And now North Korea has taken to openly criticizing China. So one has to wonder: how is it that America’s government continues to do such a bad job of convincing China that we are trustworthy—or at least worthy of cooperation?

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[1] In Freeman, Carla P. (Ed.). (2015). China and North Korea: Strategic and Policy Perspectives from a Changing China.

[2] Ibid

[3] Ibid, p. 43

Who's Nuking Whom?

North Korea’s first successful test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile on Tuesday has made a big splash, and well it should, but in reading the media commentary, I have heard a lot about how the president has or has not bungled North Korea, whether or not China is responsible, and so on, but fairly few details about the precise level of threat posed by the DPRK’s nuclear weapons. Let’s pause for a moment to take nuclear warfare seriously. What is North Korea capable of? What defenses do South Korea, Japan, and the US possess?  

America is not going to be nuked (by North Korea)

Back in May, the US conducted the first ever successful intercept of an ICBM, using the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system stationed at Vandenburg Airforce Base in California. The missile was launched from the Marshall Islands and intercepted over the Pacific Ocean. I think for people who grew up during the end of the Cold War, it may come as something of a surprise to learn that no one had ever successfully conducted a test-interception of an ICBM before. This does not mean, of course, that this particular missile defense system would intercept ICBMs with a 100% success rate in the future. The system has successfully intercepted only 9/17 short- and medium-range missiles launched in tests since 1999. However, our sensors would detect an ICBM fairly soon after its launch, which means we would have the opportunity to launch multiple missiles to the intercept it, so the chance of our successfully intercepting an ICBM is definitely better than half.

Not comforted? Well, ok, but I would also argue that North Korea is not going to launch such a missile for one very important reason: Kim Jong Un does not want to die.

North Korea is a rational actor

People tend to think of North Korea as the wacky land of perfectly synchronized kindergarten accordion ensembles and baffling hairdos. This leads us to a number of illusions, the foremost being that the Kim dynasty is simply crazy. The problem with the label of crazy is that the attribution of a total lack of rationality to a person shuts down any attempt to understand that person’s actions.

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is a rational response to its national security concerns. The conventional (non-nuclear) military capabilities of the US-South Korea-Japan alliance far, far outweigh North Korea’s capabilities. If there were a war, there is basically a 99% probability that North Korea would lose. They are not at all confident that China, their treaty ally, would assist them. Facing this reality, and considering the fact that a state in possession of nuclear weapons has never been invaded, they made the rational choice to equip themselves with a deterrent. A nuclear arsenal gives them Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) vis-à-vis South Korea, and the closer they get to having an arsenal of ICBMs, the closer they get to having MAD vis-à-vis the US. They are simply trying to survive.

America could obliterate North Korea – not to mention planet Earth

Of course, North Korea is still very, very far from having MAD capability in light of the fact that America possesses an estimated 4018 nuclear weapons. Should North Korea launch a first strike, it is a distinct possibility that the president of the United States would decide to use a certain number of those missiles to end the existence of North Korea. For that matter, America has enough nuclear weapons to end all life on Earth. By the way, exactly the same thing could be said of Russia, which possesses 7300 nuclear warheads. If all of these were simultaneously launched at the US, for example, regardless of whether we could intercept a fair number of them, enough would land that it does not take a great leap of the imagination to suppose that humanity would face a nuclear winter scenario.

North Korea is a real threat… to South Korea and Japan

Although I have argued that North Korea is a rational actor, and although I do not believe that Kim Jong Un personally would be willing to face the consequences of launching a nuclear strike, let’s suppose I am wrong. North Korea does not yet possess many ICBMs, but it certainly has enough short- and medium- range ballistic missiles to hit South Korea or Japan with one or more nuclear warheads.

This map shows us how far some of North Korea’s missiles reach (though targeting is another matter). Among those listed here, Nodong is the important one, because this class has been successfully tested numerous times, and they possess a stockpile of a few hundred. These could be used to hit South Korea or Japan with nuclear warheads. The missile which you see Alaska in range of, Taepodong-2, is actually a rocket which has been used to launch a satellite, and there is no evidence that it is intended for use as an ICBM.

Missile defense systems offer South Korea and Japan limited protection

Both South Korea and Japan deploy Patriot missile defense systems from the United States, an earlier version of which had a 40% to 79% success rate against SCUD missiles launched in the first Gulf War. Though the system has since improved, one would like to see a 100% success rate, were one expecting to be attacked.

That's where THAAD comes in. South Korea now possesses another defense against short-range ballistic missiles in the form of the THAAD missile defense system which the US recently deployed in Korea despite strong protest from China (about which more in another post). THAAD has had a 100% intercept success rate in the last eleven trials, and includes "up to 72 interceptors per battery." I take that to mean that if North Korea launched 100 ballistic missiles at once, the single THAAD battery stationed in South Korea would shoot down 72/100. 

As I mentioned above, North Korea has a few hundred Nodong missiles, so the current THAAD battery appears to be a step in the right direction, but it isn't perfect protection. If North Korea launched 300 ballistic missiles at once, aimed at various targets throughout South Korea, this would be what defense experts refer to as a "needle in a haystack" strategy. The idea is that regardless of how accurate one's missile defense system is, if the number of incoming missiles is greater than the number of a defending missiles, some of those incoming are going to get through. The "needle" in this haystack refer to a missile tipped with a nuclear warhead. Some say that there would be no way to defend against this form of nuclear attack, because the missile defense units wouldn’t know which missile to target. Indeed, supposing North Korea used all 10-20 of the nuclear warheads believed to be in its arsenal, attached to 10-20 Nodong missiles, and launched in a barrage of a few hundred, this appears to be a guaranteed method of hitting some targets.

Conclusion: Americans can breathe easy; people in East Asia, not so much.

The even more serious threat which North Korea presents to South Korea is in the form of conventional artillery. North Korea has thousands upon thousands of artillery pieces aimed at Seoul, and should North Korea choose to use them, hundreds of thousands if not millions of people in South Korea would die. And that’s only the opening salvo of the war. 

America is not going to be nuked anytime soon, let alone invaded. I could not confidently say the same of North Korea, which is inhabited by millions of real human beings who have thoughts and feelings like you and me. Nor of South Korea.

President Trump might want to consider filling that vacancy.